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CLOSED-END FUND IPO CONSIDERATIONS
Benjamin P. Edwards*
INTRODUCTION
While closed-end funds (CEFs) have a long history, relatively recent
research in economics and finance has provided new insights about these
funds. This essay explains the unique structure of CEFs and argues that absent
a compelling reason, investors should generally avoid purchasing CEF shares
in an initial public offering (IPO).
Few investment options seem less attractive than buying the shares of a
closed-end fund in an IPO, particularly if similar CEFs already exist. Indeed,
the continuing existence of CEFs has puzzled economists for decades.
Because the IPO shares are sold at a premium and will soon trade at a
significant discount, economists cannot discern any good reason why a rational
investor would purchase CEF shares in an IPO instead of purchasing the shares
of a CEF already on the market.1 If no rational investor would buy CEF shares
during an IPO, then CEFs should eventually cease to exist because new CEFs
would not be created.2 Yet CEF IPOs persist, and stockbrokers continue to
sell CEF shares to retail investors, despite a long record of underperformance.3
*Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law.
J.D., Columbia Law School. Special thanks to Elissa J. Germaine, Cathy Hwang,
Mark A. Summers, and Juliette Metelus for comments on earlier drafts.
1. See Charles M. C. Lee, Andrei Shleifer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: ClosedEnd Mutual Funds, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 153 (1990) [hearinafter Anomalies] (“So, puzzle
one: Why does anyone buy these funds when they are first issued?”); Charles M. C.
Lee, Andrei Shleifer & Richard H. Thaler, Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End
Fund Puzzle, 46 J. FIN. 75, 75 (1991) [hereinafter Investor Sentiment] (“Few problems
in finance are as perplexing as the closed-end fund puzzle”).
2. See Kathleen Weiss Hanley, Charles M. C. Lee & Paul J. Seguin, The Marketing of
Closed-End Fund IPOs: Evidence from Transactions Data, 5 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION
127, 127 (1996) (“in a rational expectation equilibrium, these [CEFs] should not get
started at all”).
3. One recent study revealed that when compared against CEF shares already on the
market (seasoned shares), shares purchased during a CEF IPO underperformed
seasoned shares by 8.52% after six months and 11.05% after one year. DIANA SHAO,
CLOSED-END FUND IPOS: SOLD NOT BOUGHT (Aug. 27, 2015) (unpublished
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This essay breaks down some of the unique characteristics of CEFs and
their IPOs. It then turns to consider whether broker-dealer firms conducting
CEF IPOs act in a manner consistent with their customers’ best interests.
Ultimately, I argue that the sale of CEF IPO shares appears difficult to
reconcile with the best interests of retail investors.
I. CLOSED-END FUND CHARACTERISTICS
A CEF is an investment company that differs from more common openend mutual funds in important ways.4 Unlike the ordinary open-end mutual
fund, a CEF does not continually offer shares for investors to purchase.
Rather, a CEF sells a fixed number of shares at one time.5 If the CEF’s
investors seek to liquidate their holdings, they must find another market
participant to buy their shares. A CEF share’s value is determined by the
supply of and demand for the CEF share. The CEF does not sell any assets to
redeem shares until some later point when it may liquidate or convert into an
open-end fund. This means that the market sets the price for a CEF’s shares
and that it may differ significantly from the net asset value (NAV) of the assets
held by the CEF.6 In contrast, the price of an ordinary mutual fund’s shares is
set by the value of its assets, which are sold or purchased as money flows out
of or into the fund. This means that investors holding ordinary mutual fund
shares may sell their shares in exchange for a payment approximating the
mutual fund’s NAV. This is not always the case with CEFs, which frequently
trade at a discount to NAV because the secondary market value for CEF shares
frequently settles at some point significantly below the CEF’s NAV.

manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2652432 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.265
2432.
4. For a description of the difference, see Daniel S. Alterbaum, Control Share Acts,
Closed-End Funds, and the Battle for Corporate Control, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
310, 316 (2012).
5. See SEC, Closed End Fund Information, FAST ANSWERS, available:
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfclose.htm (last modified Jan 16, 2013).
6. A fund’s NAV is calculated by dividing the funds asset value by its number of shares
outstanding.
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A. The CEF Initial Public Offering Puzzle
CEF IPOs puzzle economists because the public pays more for a CEF’s
shares than the value of the assets held by the CEF. Put differently, investors
purchasing CEF shares in an IPO seemingly pay more for the shares than they
are worth.7 Creating a CEF is not costless. The overall underwriting and
promotion expenses may reach about eight percent of the offering price.8 After
raising these funds and paying offering expenses, the CEF uses the remaining
proceeds to buy its portfolio of securities—assets which already have
established market values. This raises an obvious question: why would any
rational person pay $100 for $92 of assets? What justifies this significant
premium?
If a CEF’s shares increased in value after the IPO, that price increase could
explain why investors would pay a premium for shares. But this is not what
happens. CEF IPOs differ significantly from the IPOs of the securities of
traditional industrial issuers, i.e., firms that produce goods for sale. When an
industrial firm goes public, the securities offered in the IPO usually increase
in price by a significant amount, rewarding purchasers and making the decision
to purchase IPO shares rational.9 In contrast, CEF IPOs generally provide their
purchasers with zero first day returns because the CEF shares do not ordinarily
trade for an amount greater than the CEF’s net asset value.
The different first day behavior for industrial firm IPOs and CEF IPOs
makes intuitive sense. When an ordinary business sells shares to the public in
an IPO, no established market value for the firm exists. As the shares begin to
trade, the market sets a price for the shares and values the company. To induce
investors to purchase the shares at the IPO, industrial firms ordinarily price
their IPO shares at something below anticipated market price. When the shares
hit the market, they frequently trade up—which is to say that the shares
appreciate in price as other market participants bid to acquire the shares
because they view the IPO price to be less than the firm’s intrinsic value—or
at least the value other market participants will likely assign it. In contrast, a
CEF generally purchases financial assets that already have established market
values; the CEF’s shares do not ordinarily trade up. This indicates that market
7. Anomalies, supra note 1, at 162 (“To explain why investors buy funds initially at a
premium one needs to have noise traders, or ‘suckers,’ who are sufficiently optimistic
to buy overpriced assets”) (emphasis added).
8. Hanley et al., supra note 2.
9. Hanley et al., supra note 2 (“While industrial IPOs have an average initial day return
of approximately sixteen percent, closed-end fund IPOs show zero first-day returns”).
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participants do not view the CEF’s creation as transformative enough to justify
paying more than $100 per share for approximately $92 of net asset value per
share.
B. The Puzzling Discount
The decision to purchase shares in a CEF IPO appears even more puzzling
because the shares that are first sold at a premium soon sink to trade at a
discount to the CEF’s NAV as the fund seasons.10 A “seasoned” CEF is one
that has already been on the market for some time and is generally trading at a
discount.
Why seasoned CEFs trade at a discount also puzzles economists because
a CEF’s assets have established market prices. When a seasoned CEF owns
$92 of securities, a rational investor would seemingly want to buy a CEF share
if it were priced below $92 because the investor would be able to acquire $92
worth of assets for something less than $92. Despite this, CEFs normally trade
at significant discounts after six months, often as much as 10% or more.11
While a variety of explanations for the usual discount and occasional premium
have been proffered by academics, the discount phenomenon is so well
established that the Securities and Exchange Commission requires CEF issuers
to state that CEFs normally trade at a discount in their prospectuses.12
If, for some rational reason, an investor wanted to buy the shares of a CEF,
the choice between buying IPO shares and seasoned shares appears clear.13 If
shares of a similar, seasoned CEF may be acquired at a discount, no rational
investor should purchase shares in a CEF IPO. Investors purchasing in the
IPO essentially forgo the opportunity to acquire a seasoned CEF at a discount
and instead purchase an unseasoned CEF at a premium. To illustrate the
decision, an investor purchasing shares in a CEF IPO may pay $100 for $92
worth of assets with a near certainty that she will only be able to sell her
10. Of course, CEF shares may also trade at a premium to NAV but do so much less
frequently.
11. See Edward S. O’Neal, Closed-end Fund IPOs, SEC. LITIG. AND CONSULTING
GRP., at 2 (2007), http://www.slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/Closed%20End%20Fund
%20IPOs.pdf.
12. Registration Form For Closed-End Management Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 6842, 1989 WL 257682 (SEC) (July 28, 1989).
13. See Shao, supra note 3 (documenting the remarkable underperformance of CEF
IPO shares when compared to similar, seasoned CEF shares).
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interest in the CEF at a discount, e.g. for $82, after a holding the CEF for six
months. In contrast, had the investor purchased a similar, seasoned CEF share
at a discount in the market, she could have acquired a similar pool of assets
with a NAV of $92 for only $82. It could be rational for an investor to
purchase these discounted shares if she would be able to hold the CEF until it
liquidates or converts into an open-ended structure, allowing investors to
redeem their shares for NAV.
C. The Price Stabilization Problem
CEF IPOs are also unique because of the time it takes for the discount to
emerge. This gap reveals that extensive price stabilization occurs in the weeks
following the IPO with the lead underwriter or underwriters seemingly
supporting the price for an initial period.14 While ordinary industrial firm IPOs
quickly move to an efficient market price, most of the price decline for CEF
shares occurs somewhere between 30 and 100 days after the IPO.15
Initial price supports delay the inevitable adjustment to a fair market price.
Illustrating the extent of price supports, one recent study found that “the ratio
of the volume of seller-initiated to buyer-initiated trades on the first day is
approximately 19:1.”16 This high sell-to-buy ratio indicates that, while many
CEF IPO purchasers quickly dump their shares during the initial period, the
market provides few willing buyers other than the underwriter providing price
supports.17 This rush of initial sales creates a problem for the underwriters
providing financial support. If too many initial investors are “flippers”
(persons that immediately sell IPO shares), it may be too costly for an

14. See Hanley et al., supra note 2, at 2 (“We also observe several indicators of
considerable price stabilization”) (emphasis added).
15. See Kathleen Weiss, The Post-Offering Price Performance of Closed-End Funds,
18 FIN. MGMT. 57 (1989).
16. See Hanley et al., supra note 2, at 15 (further explaining that “when foreign country
funds are removed from the sample [of CEF IPO transaction data] the [sell to buy]
ratio exceeds 70:1”).
17. One additional factor causing the delay may be the inability of market participants
to short the CEF as soon as it begins to trade. It generally takes at least a month for a
CEF’s shares to be formally delivered to broker-dealers and thus available for other
investors to borrow and short.
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underwriter to sustain price supports.18
Yet, why become a flipper with CEF IPO shares? Why would an investor
pay a premium over NAV for IPO shares only to sell them back after the IPO
for the same price-supported purchase price? What profit could come from
this rapid turnover? One possible explanation is that brokers employed by
members of the underwriting syndicate—particularly those members not
providing the price support—may sell to flippers “to quickly collect the selling
fees.”19 The flippers may agree to buy for two reasons: (i) a quick sell during
the price stabilization period carries little risk; and (ii) brokers may “promise
favors, including large allocations in future underpriced IPOs.”20 Thus,
flippers may be seeking to profit not from the CEF IPO but from their
relationship with a particular broker. By helping a broker obtain a large
commission, the investor may curry favor and gain access to underpriced IPOs.
Buying back IPO shares from these flippers costs the underwriters money.
Why do lead underwriters provide this price stabilization? There are at least
three reasons for underwriters to stabilize secondary market prices for an initial
period. First, a stable price may protect the “lead underwriter’s relationship
with investors as well as its reputational capital.”21 Second, a delayed drop
may obscure reality—that the CEF’s shares were overpriced in the IPO.
Finally, the actual cost of price support may be mitigated if, anticipating a
barrage of flippers, the underwriters sold more shares than actually issued,
giving the underwriters a net short position that may be covered by buying
back flipper shares post IPO.22 Correctly anticipating flipper volume allows a
lead underwriter to sustain price supports and avoid the reputational stigma
associated with an immediate decline in price.23
18. See Hanley et al., supra note 2, at 2.
19. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
20. One additional possibility is that some flippers may agree to purchase after the
broker promises to split the generous selling commission.
21. See Hanley et al., supra note 2, at 6. For a discussion illustrating the vital
importance of reputation in a different economic context, see Jamila Jefferson-Jones,
A Good Name: Applying Regulatory Takings Analysis to Reputational Damage
Caused by Criminal History, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 497, 527 (2013).
22. For a description of the techniques underwriters use to manage the costs of
flipping, see Hanley et al., supra note 2, at 8-10 (describing the use of the overallotment or “green shoe” option).
23 See Shao, supra note 3, at 4 (“To delay and camouflage the price decline,
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D. Institutional Investors Avoid CEF IPOs
While price stabilization delays the decline and obscures the overpriced
nature of CEF IPO shares, it does not induce all investors to buy CEF IPOs.24
Recent empirical information regarding CEF holders tends to confirm the
impression that sophisticated investors do not purchase CEF shares in IPOs.25
The evidence indicates that “institutional ownership in recent CEF IPOs is
extremely low compared to operating company IPOs.”26 This means that,
when institutional money managers evaluate investment opportunities, they
generally pass on CEF IPOs.27
E. Other Unique Attributes
To be sure, the closed-end fund structure does offer certain unique
attributes that are not available to open-end funds—attributes which might
theoretically justify a decision to pay a premium. For instance, unlike an openended fund, a closed-end fund does not have to liquidate investment positions
when a shareholder wants to sell.28 This allows CEFs to take less liquid
positions without fear that investor demands for return of capital will force
underwriters provide price support.”).
24. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 725 (2003) (“institutions
hold only a very small percentage of closed-end mutual fund shares, leaving individual
investors as the central clientele for this type of investment.”).
25. See Shao, supra note 3.
26. Id. at 3.
27. If an institutional money manager purchased and held CEF IPO shares, they would
underperform and likely attract less capital than their competitors. See Ronald J.
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 893
(2013) (“For-profit institutions like mutual funds have learned that investors follow
relative performance and direct assets accordingly.”).
28. See John P. Freeman, Stuart L. Brown & Steve Pomerantz, Mutual Fund Advisory
Fees: New Evidence and A Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 153 (2008)
(“closed-end funds feature less liquidity pressure than mutual funds since their shares
are not redeemable, and new shares are not constantly being sold.”).
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them to liquidate their positions. While CEFs have the ability to take these
less liquid, longer-term positions, one recent study found that, in practice,
CEFs tend to hold more short maturity assets than open-ended funds.29
CEFs may also employ more leverage than open-ended mutual funds.30
Funds using more leverage may experience higher returns and greater
volatility and risk.
II. CLOSED-END FUND IPOS & INVESTOR INTERESTS
Sales to retail customers are currently governed by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority’s controversial “suitability” standard.31 Rather than
attempting to parse the precise meaning of the suitability standard,32 this essay
simply considers whether recommending CEF IPO shares is generally
consistent with most retail investors’ best interests in light of the arguments
frequently proffered to justify CEF IPOs.
It appears difficult to reconcile most sales of CEF IPO shares with the best
interests of investors, raising questions about why the offerings occur.
Economists and other experts studying the products have theorized that the
29. See Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber, Christopher R. Blake & Or Shachar, Why
Do Closed-End Bond Funds Exist? An Additional Explanation for the Growth in
Domestic Closed-End Bond Funds, 48 J. FIN. AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 405
(2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1591157.
30. For a discussion about how closed-end funds may use more leverage than openended funds, see LOIS YUROW, TIMOTHY W. LEVIN, W. JOHN MCGUIRE & JAMES M.
STOREY, MUTUAL FUNDS REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK § 32:4 (2015).
31. For discussions about the distinctions between a best interests Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority’s current suitability standard, see Benjamin P. Edwards,
Fiduciary Duty and Investment Advice: Will A Uniform Fiduciary Duty Make A
Material Difference?, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 105, 111 (2014); Christine Lazaro &
Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented Regulation of Investment Advice: A Call for
Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47, 66-67 (2014) (“the
Suitability Rule does not explicitly provide that a Broker’s recommendations must be
in the customer’s best interests”).
32. For an analysis and authority that the suitability standard requires
recommendations consistent with customers’ best interests, see James S. Wrona, The
Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-Based Analysis of the Legal Obligations of Investment
Advisers and Broker-Dealers and A Framework for Enhanced Investor Protection, 68
BUS. LAW. 1, 19 (2012) (collecting authority).
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CEF IPO shares are bought by “noise traders, or ‘suckers,’ who are sufficiently
optimistic to buy overpriced assets.”33 Some assert that “[i]nvestors who wish
to hold closed-end funds should never buy them at the IPO and the suggestion
that they should by financial advisors is suspect.”34 If only a “sucker” would
buy the overpriced asset, there may not be a reasonable basis for concluding
that the purchase is consistent with an investor’s best interests.
A. Eventual Positive Share Price Return
Still, some weak arguments for buying CEF IPO shares have been made.
For instance, to educate the public, one financial firm provides articles about
CEFs in the “Learning Center” portion of its website.35 One article contends
that it would be “unwise” for investors to pass on CEF IPO because “[a] study
we conducted of all CEF IPOs from Jan. 1, 2001, through Oct. 31, 2011, found
that 73.7% of the IPOs had positive share price total returns since inception.”36
Based on this “limited study,” the article’s authors make the interestinglyphrased claim that they do not believe “that investing in CEF IPOs, in general,
is a fool’s game.”37
Given the dynamics discussed above, the meager prospect of eventual
positive share price returns does not seem appealing. Consider what eventual
positive share price returns means in the context of the hypothetical CEF IPO
33. Anomalies, supra note 1, at 162 (noting that “[i]t helps to have a gimmick” such
as a famous asset manager). In the economics literature the term “noise trader” is
frequently used as a euphemism for idiot. Lawrence Summers famously “began a
paper on finance by declaring: ‘THERE ARE IDIOTS. Look around.’” Paul
Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. MM36, Sept. 2,
2009,
available
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economict.html?_r=0 (explaining that “the preferred term in academic literature” for idiots is
“noise traders”).
34. See O’Neal, supra note 11, at 2.
35. Morningstar, Closed-end fund IPO Premium (2012), https://www.fidelity.com/
learning-center/investment-products/closed-end-funds/ipo-premium.
36. Id.
37. Id. The article also stresses that “[j]ust because a CEF is suitable for your portfolio
doesn’t mean it’s in your best interests. There’s a large difference between the
suitability and fiduciary-duty standards.” Contra Wrona, supra note 32, at 55 (arguing
that “the widely held belief that broker-dealers are subject to substantially lower
standards of conduct is illusory”).
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discussed above. At the IPO, the investor pays $100 for a share. After
subtracting commissions and offering expenses, the CEF purchases $92 of
assets per share. Even though the CEF only holds $92 of assets per share, the
underwriter will likely stabilize the price for the first three months, after which
the market will adjust and the CEF’s shares will most likely trade at a discount
to the CEF’s NAV, meaning that if the CEF has $92 of net assets per share,
the market price on offer to buy a share may be only $82. As months pass into
years, the CEF’s underlying investments may perform well and the CEF’s
NAV may rise significantly, perhaps even to $112 of NAV per share. If the
CEF still trades at an approximate 10% discount, the market may then offer
more than $100 per share—yielding the positive share price return.
Plainly, investor interests would be better served by purchasing the shares
of CEFs already trading at a discount or by purchasing a lower-cost open-end
fund that could be liquidated at something near NAV. At the least, fairly
evaluating whether an investor should buy a CEF IPO share requires some
comparative assessment to other products on the market. Here, CEF investors
could buy seasoned CEF shares instead and experience a near certainty of
significantly higher returns than they would obtain by buying unseasoned
shares during the IPO. As mentioned earlier, one recent study found that CEF
IPO shares underperformed comparable seasoned CEF shares by 11.05% after
one year.38 Given the performance differential, recommending IPO shares
over similar, seasoned shares appears most likely to lead to significant
underperformance.
B. Purported Long-Term Structural Benefits
Other arguments fail to address the IPO problem. For example, in defense
of CEFs, generally, some supporters have contended that the CEF structure
allows CEFs to take longer-term positions than could be taken with the
redemption demands facing open-ended funds. Unlike open-end funds, CEFs
do not need to unwind long-term positions if panicky investors seek to redeem
their shares. This argument misses the point because it does not justify the
purchase of CEF IPO shares whenever similar funds already trade at a
discount.
Additionally, most CEFs may not actually use their purported ability to
take longer-term positions. CEFs’ actual holdings tend toward shorter38. See Shao, supra note 3, at 1.
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maturity assets.39 A CEF IPO featuring short-maturity strategies and holdings
should not attempt to justify its existence by pointing out that it has the
structural ability to do something it does not intend to do.
C. Managerial Skill
Some CEF IPOs have been justified by claims that the exceptional talent
of the manager retained to manage the CEF’s assets justifies the premium.40
While this remains a theoretical possibility, it would require the accurate
identification of a truly exceptional manager, one capable of rapidly
outperforming the difference between the IPO premium and the seasoned CEF
discount. Even if such a manager were identified, it would still appear
preferable to wait until the fund seasoned and began to trade at a discount.
D. Unusual Market Circumstances
In limited circumstances, CEF IPOs might appear less ill-advised. For
example, in times of high investor sentiment, seasoned CEFs have been known
to trade at premiums to their NAV. While this does not occur regularly, it does
happen and is associated with increased CEF IPO offerings.41 When similar,
seasoned CEFs trade at a premium, the value differential between IPO shares
and seasoned shares diminishes. This, of course, does not mean that it is in an
investor’s best interests to purchase CEF shares in an IPO. The vast majority
of the time, CEFs trade at a discount and CEF shares purchased in an IPO will
most likely move to trade at a discount in the future.
CONCLUSION
Institutional investors generally pass on CEF IPOs for good reasons. The
IPO shares tend to significantly underperform existing CEF shares and other
mechanisms for gaining exposure to the underlying asset classes, such as
39. See Elton et al., supra note 29.
40. See SIMON LACK, WALL STREET POTHOLES 27 (Wiley 2015) (explaining that
“[i]t’s generally the dumb money that buys a CEF IPO at” issue price).
41. See Investor Sentiment, supra note 1 (arguing that CEF discounts and premiums
may be used to measure investor sentiment).
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buying open-ended funds that already exist. Moreover, the problems with CEF
IPOs have been known, studied, and discussed for decades in the finance and
economics literature. Given this reality, the continued sale of CEF IPOs to
retail investors does not appear aligned with their best interests.

